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ABSTRACT 
 
The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security*
 
In this paper we study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The 
data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries make it clear that urbanization and 
industrialization are strongly associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe a 
model economy in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together. 
We study an economy with two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city 
(industrial). The decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to 
productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Furthermore, the 
level of social security is determined by majority voting. We show that a calibrated version of 
this economy is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States. Initially a 
majority of voters live on the farm and do not want to implement social security. Once a 
majority of the voters move to the city, the median voter prefers a positive social security tax. 
In the model social security emerges and is sustained over time as a political and economic 
equilibrium. Modeling the political economy of social security within a model of structural 
change leads to a rich economic environment in which the median voter is identified by both 
age and location. 
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1 Introduction
In the United States, the 19th and early 20th centuries were characterized by a movement
from a primarily rural and agricultural economy to a primarily urban and industrial economy.
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of the U.S. population between 1800 and 1940.1
In the beginning of the 19th century 94% of the population was living in rural areas. By
1940 the share of population living in rural areas was only 43.5%, while the share living
on the farm was only 23%. Coincident with this immense shift in the structure of the
economy came changes in the institutional needs of the population. The sorts of social care
arrangements that were common place on the farm were harder to implement and enforce
in the city, and the shifting population gave rise to new political coalitions with disparate
views on social policy. Many prominent accounts of changing institutions of this period,
e.g. Wiebe (1967), Sass (1997) and Schieber and Shoven (1999), emphasize the critical role
that urbanization and industrialization played in the creation of new institutions: The
willingness of the U.S. to nally go the route of so many other countries in adopting a
national social insurance program in 1935 was the result of three major forces. The rst was
the increased dependence on wage income that had arisen over the preceding half-century
as the country had industrialized,(Schieber and Shoven 1999, page 17). Indeed, the Social
Security Administration (2003) characterizes the year 1920 as a historical tipping-point. In
that year, for the rst time in our nations history, more people were living in cities than on
farms.
In this paper, we propose that the rural (agricultural) to urban (industrial) shift is one
possible explanation for the emergence of social insurance, more specically, social security.
There is a signicant literature on the political economy of social security systems that ana-
lyzes the political sustainability of Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security.2 The conclusion
1 Appendix A provides data sources for all gures.
2 There also exists a large literature that analyzes macroeconomic and distributional implications of the
current social security system without political economy considerations (e.g. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and
Joines 1985).
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of most of this literature is that support for social security in democratic societies depends
on the age of the median voter.3 These papers are oriented toward explaining why an ex-
isting system can survive, expand or shrink.4 They cannot address why such a system was
started in the rst place, or more precisely, why such systems have not always existed.5 By
allowing the identity of the median voter to include his geographical location, we overcome
this shortcoming and provide a framework in which the emergence of social security is a
response to the urbanization of the population.
The e¤ects of urbanization and industrialization on social insurance has long been recog-
nized by political scientists and sociologists. What are referred to as the prerequisites and
the logic of industrialism explanations of the emergence of social security give prominent
roles to urbanization and industrialization. According to Collier and Messick (1975, page
1303), The prerequisites approach treats the development of social security as a result
of the social and economic transformations associated with the transition from primarily
agricultural to industrial economies. Within this perspective, one of the most important
hypotheses is that the decline in the proportion of the workforce in agriculture increases the
need for social security.6 Figure 2 shows the level of urbanization and the fraction of
the elderly (65+) population across U.S. states in 1930. About 23 states (those encircled)
introduced a state pension plan before the 1935 Social Security Act. Of those, 18 states had
3 Cooley and Soares (1999), Galasso (1999), and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) build models in which
non-altruistic median voters decide to keep an existing system. The median voters decision depends on two
factors in these models: First, there exists a reputational mechanism in place which eliminates all future
benets if the median voter deviates from the current arrangement. Therefore, a median voter cannot avoid
taxes today and hope to get benets in the future. Second, the median voter might want to keep an existing
social security system in order to benet from the high interest rates associated with a depressed capital
stock.
4 For example, Cooley and Soares (1996) study an economy in which the initial generation votes over
a social security replacement rule that depends on the age structure of the population. Hence, as the
population structure changes (e.g. as a result of the Baby Boom) a rule that was sustainable in the past
can become unsustainable. Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005) link the size of intergenerational transfers to
the age structure of the population. Conesa and Krueger (1999) study how the status-quo bias is related to
idiosyncratic uncertainty.
5 Krueger and Kubler (2005) study how the introduction of an unfunded social security system can be
Pareto improving in an economy with incomplete markets.
6 Also, see Pryor (1968).
2
an urbanization rate higher than the U.S. average. The correlation between the fraction of
elderly population and state pensions is also positive but smaller than that for urbanization
(only 65% of states with higher than average elderly population had adopted pension plans).
Although this picture provides only suggestive evidence, the basic relation seems to hold up
to empirical scrutiny. Amenta and Carruthers (1988) look at the timing of old age pension
plan adoption among U.S. states. They nd a statistically signicant e¤ect of urbanization
on the passage of old age pension plans. More compelling is that the relationship remains
in cross-country data. Figure 3 shows the correlation between the fraction of the labor force
in agriculture at the start of the 20th century and the date in which a social security system
was introduced among European countries. Clearly, a larger labor force in agriculture is as-
sociated with later adoption. Kim (2001) investigates the timing of old-age pension adoption
across O.E.C.D. countries in more detail and nds that the percent of labor not employed
in agriculture is strongly associated with the adoption of old-age pensions.
What were the economic and demographic forces that led to this shift from rural to urban
population? One obvious answer to this question is the increase in the city wage relative
to the farm wage that arose from greater technical change in the city relative to the farm.
GDP per person employed increased by a factor of 3.5 in the U.S. between 1870 and 1940
(Maddison 2001). While productivity in both the agriculture and the non-agricultural sectors
grew rapidly during this period, the growth in non-agricultural sectors was faster than the
growth in agriculture, leading to the transformation of the U.S. economy (see Greenwood
and Seshadri 2002 and Greenwood and Uysal 2005). Figure 4 shows the change in total
factor productivity (TFP) in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in the U.S. Between
1800 and 1940, TFP grew by a factor of 1.92 in agriculture, while it grew by a factor of 4.21
in manufacturing.
Another possible impetus for rural-urban migration is the increase in life expectancy
that took place over this time period. As life expectancy increased, two important changes
occurred in the agricultural sector. First, the amount of farm labor relative to farm land rose,
causing farm wages to fall. Second, as farmers lived longer, the transfer of land ownership
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via inheritance was delayed. Both events increased the relative attractiveness of living in
the city for farmers, and encouraged rural-urban migration. Of crucial importance for this
story is not that life expectancy at birth increased, but that life expectancy conditional on
reaching or getting near retirement age increased. Figure 5 shows the changes in conditional
survival probabilities from age 60 to 65, from 65 to 70, from 70 to 75, and from 75 to 80.
Survival probabilities increased by about 5 percentage points between 1850 and 1900, and
by another 2 percentage points between 1900 and 1940.
We propose a model economy in which structural transformation from a rural to an
urban economy is modeled together with a political process that determines a social security
system. In our model, the emergence of social security is intertwined with social changes,
demographics, and technology. We merge two literatures: the political economy of social
security and structural change (e.g. Laitner 2000 and Hansen and Prescott 2002). This
allows us to study the set of demographic, social, and economic conditions that give rise
to an economy without social security and the changes that could eventually lead to the
introduction of publicly managed old age security. We argue that this major structural shift
is important for thinking about the introduction of social security because the rural/urban
shift has implications for the provision of income for those who survive to old age.7 As
people migrate from the farm to the city, they can no longer rely on land as a source of
old-age security, and political support for social security increases.
We study an overlapping generations economy with two sectors, which we interpret as
agricultural and industrial. Farm production requires capital, labor and land. Land is a xed
factor, so there are decreasing returns to labor. City production on the other hand requires
capital and labor and exhibits constant returns to scale.8 Agents in this economy live up to
7 Although the Great Depression is often considered as a major force behind the social security legislation
in the U.S., its e¤ects are far from clear. Miron and Weil (1998) conclude their study on the origins of social
security by stating that: Regarding the lasting impact of the Great Depression, our conclusion is that
there were surprisingly little.(page 321). On the macroeconomic e¤ects of Great Depression, see Cole and
Ohanian (2004).
8 Hansen and Prescott (2002) model the industrial revolution as a switch from a (Malthus) production
technology with a xed factor of production, land, to a (Solow) production technology, with no xed factors.
Parente and Prescott (2005) use a similar framework to study the evolution of international income levels
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three periods, as young, middle aged and old. They face an exogenous probability of dying
at the end of the second period of their lives. Land is passed from one generation to another
by inheritance. Each period young agents make a once and for all decision about where
to live.9 There is also a social security system that taxes the young and the middle aged
and pays transfers to the old. The level of social security taxes is determined by majority
voting.10 In the initial steady state of this economy the relative productivity of the farm
sector is high and survival probabilities are low. As a result, farm incomes are high relative
to city incomes. All agents live on the farm, and land is an important source of income for
the old. The median voter is a middle-aged farmer who prefers a zero social security tax.
When the city becomes more productive, people start migrating, and the importance of land
diminishes. Eventually, the median voter becomes a middle-aged city worker who prefers
a positive social security tax. While the framework is relatively simple, it leads to a rich
political economy environment. The identity of the median voter is not just age, but also
location, which turns out to be critical for generating the emergence of social security. This
is achieved by merging the structural transformation from farm to city with the political
economy of institutions, in this case social security.11
In the next section we describe the economic environment. In Section 3 we discuss the
economic equilibrium, given an exogenous political process. In Section 4 we describe how
since 1750. Laitner (2000) study a two-good, two-sector model in which, like Hansen and Prescott (2002),
only the agricultural sector uses land. He studies why saving rate increases with development. Other
well-known models of structural change are Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001).
Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) model the shift of labor from
agriculture to manufacturing, and the associated pattern of rural to urban migration, that is associated with
process of economic development.
9 Among recent models with an explicit location decision see Vandenbroucke (2008), Hassler, Rodríguez
Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005), and Klein and Ventura (2006).
10 The current paper follows the recent literature on dynamic models of political economy; see among
others Krusell, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1997), Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999), Hassler, Rodríguez Mora,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003), and Corbea, DErasmo and Kuruscu (2008).
11 Graziella (2006) studies the long run decline in the importance of bequest taxes within a two-sector
(agriculture and manufacturing) dynamic political economy model. In her model, land is easier to tax than
capital. The decline of agriculture, which reduces the value of land, makes bequest taxes an unattractive
option over time. Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2008) study the e¤ects of the concentration of land ownership
on human capital accumulation and growth within a political economy model.
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taxes are determined. We provide some analytical results for a simplied version of the
model in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe the results of our simulations. We conclude in
Section 7.
2 Environment
Consider the following one-good, two-sector overlapping generations model. In the rst
sector (or location), which we will call the farm, labor, capital and land are combined to
produce output. In the second sector (or location), which we call the city, the same good is
produced using only labor and capital.
Agents live a maximum of 3 periods, which we refer to as young, middle-aged and old,
and face a probability, ; of surviving from the second to the last period. The objective of
a young person is to maximize
U(cy; cm; co) = u(cy) + u(cm) + 
2u(co); (1)
where ci; i 2 fy;m; og ; denotes age-i consumption, and u is continuous, strictly increasing
and strictly concave.
Each period every middle-aged person has a child who is born into the same location.
When an agent is born on the farm, he makes a once-and-for-all decision to stay there or
move to the city. Those who are born in the city are not allowed to move to the farm.
The middle-aged and old agents cant change their locations.12 Let the fraction of young,
middle-aged and old agents who live on the farm be denoted by y; m and o; respectively.
In both locations young, middle-aged and old all inelastically supply one unit of la-
bor.13 Each agent is born without any assets (capital or land) and is endowed with lo-
cation dependent e¢ ciency units "ji ; j 2 ff; cg and i 2 fy;m; og : Since only a frac-
12 The vast majority of migration from the farm to the city consisted of young workers. (Schieber and
Shoven (1999), p. 18, and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), pp. 139, 465)
13 We therefore abstract from the rise in retirement (i.e. decline in the labor force participation of
old) since 1850s. See Kopecky (2005) for a model with endogenous retirement that links this rise to the
technological progress in the production of leisure goods.
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tion  of middle-aged people survive to old age, the total labor supply on the farm is
given by N f = y"fy + m"
f
m + o"
f
o and the total labor supply in the city by N
c =
(1  y)"cy + (1  m)"cm + (1  o)"co.
Each period, agents are located either in the city or on the farm and can only work in
that sector. There is a competitive labor market in each location. Let wj denote the wages
in sector j: Then, the labor income of an age-i agent in location j is wj"ji for i 2 fy;m; og
and j 2 ff; cg.
People are not allowed to borrow, but can accumulate capital and rent it to rms in either
sector at a competitive rate, . Capital moves costlessly between the farm and the city, so
let r =    be the common rate of return to capital, where  2 [0; 1] is the common rate of
capital depreciation. There is no market in which agents can buy and sell land. On the farm,
when an agent dies (at the end of the second or third period), his land is inherited by the
oldest surviving descendant. Therefore, a fraction of the land is owned by the o surviving
old, and the remainder is owned by the (1 )m middle-aged who inherited land early. We
normalize the total amount of land to 1, so each landholding farmer has 1
o+(1 )m units
of land. Farmers rent their land to rms at a competitive rate q:
In a similar fashion, in both locations some middle-aged agents receive accidental capital
bequests from their parents. As a result, middle-aged agents di¤er in their asset and land
holdings on the farm, while they only di¤er by their asset levels in the city. If a young farmer
chooses to move to the city, he gives up all claims on his parents land, and that land, upon
his parents death, is divided equally among the remaining land owners. However, he still
receives any accidental bequest his parent might leave, as we assume capital can freely move
between the farm and the city.
Each sector is populated by a large number of production units (family farms in the
agricultural sector and factories in the city sector) which have access to constant returns to
scale production functions represented by
Y f = fF f (Kf ; N f ; L); (2)
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and
Y c = cF c(Kc; N c); (3)
where variables Y j; Kj; N j and L, j 2 ff; cg; refer to output, capital, and labor employed
in each sector, and land used in the farm sector, respectively. The parameter j; j 2 ff; cg;
is the total factor productivity (TFP) in sector j. Land is a xed factor and used only in
the farm sector. We normalize the stock of land to one, L = 1:
Given the wage rate in sector j; wj; the rental rate for capital,  and the rental rate for
land, q; the problem of a production unit in the farm sector is given by
max
Nf ;Kf ;L

Y f   wfN f   Kf   qL	 ;
subject to (2), and in the city sector by
max
Nc;Kc
fY c   wcN c   Kcg ;
subject to (3).
Finally, there is an economy-wide social security system that collects a lump-sum tax,  ;
from the young and the middle-aged and provides each old with an amount 2=: The level
of social security taxes are determined by majority voting in a way we detail below.
Discussion The model economy captures key features of the 19th century farm economy.
First, the old in the 19th century had relatively more wealth than the old in the 20th
century and land as an illiquid asset provided an important source of income and wealth
for the elderly. In 1850, those 60 years or older had about three times as much real estate
wealth as the 30-39 age group (see Williamson and Lindert 1980, Table 1.7) and an analogous
picture emerges for total wealth in 1870 (see Soltow 1992, Table 3.2). It is therefore not
surprising that Schieber and Shoven (1999) conclude that the over-65 age cohort controlled
more wealth than any other group in the early 19th century.14
14 Rubinow (1913, pages 302 and 304-305) also notes that The authority of the patriarch is paramount
and lasts longer than his productive powers.
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Second, inheritance, and in particular inheritance of land, played a key role in wealth
accumulation. According to Soltow (1982) inheritance was the determining factor of wealth
inequality in the U.S. during the 19th century. Inheritance was a much more signicant factor
than life-cycle savings in explaining the relationship between age and wealth in the U.S. in
1870. Moreover, land was the most important form of inheritance in the 19th century.
In his study of Butler County (Ohio), Newell (1986) documents that for the 1803-1865
period, inheritance consisted almost exclusively of real property. Third, the farm population
consisted mainly of workers and owner-farmers. Renting the land to others was not common.
According to Yang (1992), about 90% of farmers were owners in 1860.15 Finally, according
to Greven (1970) and Newell (1986), inheritance was the main way to acquire land in settled
areas.
In the model people on the farm wait until their parentsdeath to obtain land through
inheritance, and land is a critical part of agentslife-cycle income proles. Young and middle-
age workers without land look forward to inheriting land when old and therefore see little
need for other savings vehicles. As Sass (1997, page 5) points out The family enterprise
institution also vested the old with powerful property rights vis-a-vis their adult children.
Elderly parents held rst claim on the rm and its assets, while their o¤spring remained
dependent for their incomes and inheritance... parents retained ownership over the main
body of family assets and chose when they would transfer farms and businesses to their
children.In the city, without land, the old are left to survive on wage income and savings
from that income alone. In this scenario, social security can provide middle-aged-city voters
with a relatively high return.
Before we move to a more detailed description of the economic environment and decisions,
a few caveats are in order. First note that arrangements where the young and the middle-
aged-landless farmers pay the landholder of the family to gain control over the land when the
landholder dies would yield equivalent results to forced land bequests as long as the return
to land is greater than the return to social security for the landless-middle-aged farmer, 2=.
15 Even at the end of the 19th Century, most farmers were owners, see Barlowe and Timmons (1950).
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Note also that it is possible to relax the assumption that young farmers who migrate lose
all claims to land. Once these original migrants inherit and sell their land, their o¤spring
will no longer have any land claims. As a result, this modication would delay the onset of
social security at most a generation. Finally, since we abstract from population growth, it is
also quite natural to treat land as a xed factor in the model. Although large tracks of land
were available in the West, the main impetus for East-West migration was the population
pressure in the East. Indeed, creating productive land was quite expensive and these costs
were only incurred due to population pressure (see Vandenbroucke, 2008).
3 Economic Equilibrium
At any point in time, the aggregate state in this economy consists of the distribution of capital
across agents, the distribution of agents across the city and the farm, the last periods tax
rate, and an indicator variable of whether or not the introduction of social security was ever
optimal for a median voter in the past. The role of this indicator function will become clear
once we dene the political equilibrium below. In this section, we assume that agents take
the political state as given.
Since agents are born without any capital, capital is owned by the middle-aged and the
old. Furthermore, because they make di¤erent decisions, it is convenient to di¤erentiate
between the asset distribution of landed- and landless-middle-aged farmers. We represent
the distribution of capital across old city and farm residents by  co and  
f
o ; and middle-aged
city residents and farmers by  cm and  
f
m with  = 1; 0 indicating whether a middle-aged
farmer is landed,  = 1; or landless,  = 0: In what follows we use 	 = ( cm;  
c
o;  
f1
m ;  
f0
m ;  
f
o)
to represent the set of distributions. We represent the distribution of agents between the
two locations, city and farm, by  = (y; m; o) where j is the fraction of age-j agents
who live on the farm. Finally, we use S = (	;;  1; h) to represent the aggregate state;
where  1 is last periods social security tax, and h is an indicator of whether or not the
introduction of social security was ever optimal for a median voter in the past. If h = 1 it
was, if h = 0, it wasnt.
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We represent the evolution of the aggregate state by three separate functions. First, we
let 	0 = G(S) represent next periods asset distribution given the current state S: Second
we let 0 = H(S) represent next periods distribution of agents across locations. In this
section we describe the recursive competitive equilibrium given an exogenous policy rule
that determines the current social security tax rate and updates the history h. In particular,
we assume that the social security tax level for the current period,  ; and the history indicator
for the next period h0, are given by ( ; h0) = P (	;;  1; h); and agents take the policy rule
P as given when making their economic decisions. Note that a system with a social security
tax  that never changes is trivially dened by ( ; 1) = P (S) for all S: Let P (S) represent
such a system. Once we dene a recursive competitive equilibrium for a given P and show
how G and H are determined, we describe how P is determined by the political process.
3.1 City Problem
We start by describing the economic problem of agents in the city. We approach agents
problems recursively, starting from the problem of an old agent, whose state consists of the
aggregate state, S = (	;;  1; h); and his individual asset level a. An old agent in the city
has three sources of income: labor income wc"co; asset income ra; and social security income
2

: Let V co (a; S) denote the value of being an old person with asset level of a: Since the old
will simply consume their total resources, this is given by
V co (a; S) = u(w
c"co + (1 + r)a+
2

);
s:t: ( ; h0) = P (S) (4)
where for expositional clarity we suppress the dependence of wc and r on aggregate state S:
Next, we look at the decisions of middle-aged agents. Unlike the old, the middle-aged
agents do not receive any social security payments, and they have to pay social security
taxes. They also have to decide how much to save for their old age. Their decisions are
determined by
11
V cm(a; S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cm + (1 + r)a     a0) + V co (a0; S 0)g ; (5)
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); P (S));
where next periods asset distribution, 	0; and next periods distribution of agents between
the two locations, 0; are determined by transition functions G(S) and H(S); while the
current tax rate  is determined via P (S): Let acm(a; S) denote the savings decision of a
middle-aged-city person with individual asset level a that results from problem (5).
Finally, we consider the decisions of the young agents who are born in the city. They are
born with no assets. They might, however, get an (accidental) bequest next period if their
parent does not survive to old-age. Let b(a; S) denote the bequest a young agent expects to
get if his middle-aged parent has assets, a; and dies before reaching old age. The problem
of a young agent is then given by
V cy (b(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cy      a0) + V cm(a0; S 0) (6)
+(1  )V cm(a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); P (S)):
Note that a young agent will get b only if his parent dies and that happens with probability
1  : Note also that the asset levels of middle-aged agents provides enough information to
determine next periods asset choices since it determines both the middle-aged as well as the
young agentssavings decisions. Let acy(b(a; S); S) be the savings decisions of a young agent
who expects to get b(a; S) as a bequest next period.
3.2 Farm Problem
The problem of an old agent on the farm is similar to the old agents problem in the city,
except the old farmer earns land income. His problem is given by
12
V fo (a; S) = u

wf"fo + (1 + r)a+
q
o + (1  )m +
2


;
s:t: ( ; h0) = P (S) (7)
where 1
o+(1 )m is the per capita amount of land on the farm, and as in equation (4), we
suppress the dependence of prices, including q; on S:
The problem of middle-aged agents on the farm is similar to that of those in the city.
The only di¤erence is that the middle-aged farmers di¤er in land-holding status. They are
either landed or landless. The middle-aged farmers problem can be written, for  = 0; 1; as
V fm (a; S) = max
a0
fu

wf"fm + (1 + r)a+
q
o + (1  )m      a
0

(8)
+V fo (a
0; S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); P (S)):
Let afm (a; S) be the decision rule for middle-aged farmers. Note that a middle-aged farmer
who survives to the next period may have a di¤erent level of land holdings than he has
today. Land per farmer may change due to migration, since migration alters the distribution
of agents across locations, which is captured by 0 = H(S).
When considering the young farmers saving decision, we need to do so jointly with his
location decision. Some young farmers may stay on the farm, and some young farmers may
move to the city. Their savings decisions will depend on where they choose to live. First
consider a young farmer who stays on the farm. If his parent dies next period, he will receive
an accidental bequest. The amount will depend on his parents assets. He might also receive
land if his parent is a land-holder. Hence, a young agents decisions will depend on the land
holding status of his parent as well. Therefore, although the young do not own any capital
or land, we label them with their parentsasset and land holding status. In particular, let
b(a; S) denote the capital bequest that a young agent expects to get from his parent who
has a units of assets and land holding status  = 0; 1: Then, a young agent who decides to
stay solves
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V fsy (b
(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wf"fy      a0) + V f0m (a0; S 0) + (9)
(1  )V fm (a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); P (S)):
Note that if his parent survives, with probability ; then the agent is landless and only has
his own savings. If, on the other hand, his parent dies, then he will get b(a; S);and may
also inherit land and become a landed middle-aged agent (if  = 1): Let his savings decision
be represented by a0 = afsy (b
(a; S); S):
Next consider a young farmer who goes to the city. If his parent dies, he will only receive
a capital bequest of b(a; S): He solves
V fgy (b
(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cy      a0) + V cm(a0; S 0) + (10)
(1  )V cm(a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); P (S)):
Let his savings decision be given by a0 = afgy (b
(a; S); S):
Finally, let L(b(a; S); S) be an indicator of whether the young farmer is a goer or a stayer,
which is simply determined by comparing his expected lifetime utility in each location, i.e.
L(b(a; S); S) =
8<: 1, if V fgy (b(a; S); S)  V fsy (b(a; S); S)0, otherwise : (11)
3.3 Updating and Aggregation
When individuals solve their problems, they take the transition functions G; H; and P as
given. While we treat P as an exogenous function in this section, the other two transition
functions, G and H; must be consistent with individual decisions in equilibrium. In this
section we analyze how the savings and location decisions of agents determine the evolution
of aggregate assets and the fraction of agents living in each location.
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We begin with the evolution of aggregate assets in the economy. In this economy, assets
are owned either by old or by middle-aged agents. Hence, given  cm(a) and  
c
o(a); the current
level of aggregate assets in the city, Ac, is simply
Ac = (1  m)
Z
ad cm(a) + (1  o)
Z
ad co(a): (12)
Similarly, the aggregate asset level on the farm, Af , is
Af = (1  )m
Z
ad f1m (a) + m
Z
ad f0m (a) + o
Z
ad fo(a): (13)
Given the particular demographic structure we have imposed, in order to determine the
aggregate assets next period, all we need to know is the asset distribution of the middle-
aged agents. To see this, note that next periods aggregate assets are determined by the
savings decisions of young and middle-aged agents. Since the savings decisions of the young
depend on the expected bequests and these bequests are determined by the savings of the
middle-aged agents, in order to nd next periods aggregate asset level Ac
0
;  cm(a) and  
f
m (a)
provide su¢ cient information: In particular, next periods aggregate asset level in the city
is given by
Ac
0
= (1  m)
Z 
acy(a
c
m(a; S); S) + a
c
m(a; S)

d cm(a) (14)
+m[
Z
L(af0m (a; S); S)a
f0g
y (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a)
+
Z
L(af1m (a; S); S))a
f1g
y (a
f1
m (a; S); S)d 
f1
m (a)]:
The rst line in this equation is the portion of next periods assets that is determined
by the savings decisions of the agents in the city. Here
R
acm(a; S)d 
c
m(a) gives the total
savings of the middle-aged agents. These savings are either carried to their old age, or
left as accidental bequests and constitute part of the assets owned by middle-aged agents
next period. The term
R
acy(a
c
m(a; S); S)d 
c
m(a) is the other part of the assets owned by
middle-aged agents next period. It captures the savings done by the young, who in equi-
librium anticipate correctly that they will receive acm(a; S) as bequests. The next two lines
capture the part of aggregate assets in the city that come from young agents who just
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moved to the city. The savings decisions of these newcomers depend on their parents asset
and land holding status, and are di¤erent from those of the young agents who are born
in the city. Hence, if a young farmer whose parent has a units of assets and no land de-
cides to go to the city, then L(af0m (a; S); S) = 1 and he saves a
f0g
y (a
f0
m (a; S); S): The termR
L(af0m (a; S); S)a
f0g
y (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a) is the aggregation of such assets.
In a similar fashion, next periods aggregate asset level on the farm is also determined
by the asset distribution of landed- and landless-middle-aged agents and by the location
decisions of the young. It is given by
Af
0
= m[
Z
[(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))af0sy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S)]d f0m (a) + (15)Z
[(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))af1sy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S)]d f1m (a)]
Like equation (14), the terms
R
af0m (a; S)d 
f0
m (a) and
R
af1m (a; S)d 
f1
m (a) represent the to-
tal savings of the middle-aged-landless and -landed agents, respectively, while the termsR
af0sy (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a) and
R
af1sy (a
f1
m (a; S); S)d 
f1
m (a) are the savings done by the young
who choose to stay on the farm.
Next, we describe how G is determined. This entails updating  cm(a);  
c
o(a);  
f1
m (a),
 f0m (a) and  
f
o(a) in a manner that is consistent with the savings behavior of individuals. To
this end, let Q = [0; a] be the set of possible asset holdings for an individual in this economy.
First, consider next periods asset distribution among the old in the city. This distribution
will be determined by the savings of the current middle-aged agents in the city who survive
to the next period. Then, it must be the case that for all ea 2 Q;
 c
0
o (ea) =  Z
Q
Ifacm(a; S) = eagd cm(a); (16)
where I(:) = 1 if acm(a; S) = ea ; and 0, otherwise. Similarly, the asset distribution of the old
on the farm is
 f
0
o (ea) =  Z
Q
Ifaf0m (a; S) = eagd f0m (a) +  Z
Q
Ifaf1m (a; S) = eagd f1m (a); (17)
where, with some abuse of notation, we use I as the appropriate indicator function.
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Next periods asset distribution among the middle-aged agents in the city is determined
by the location and savings decisions of young agents. One complication is that not all young
agents make the same savings decisions. While some of them are born in the city, others
move to the city this period. Furthermore, some of those movers had landless parents and
some had landed parents. The following equation lists each of these cases:
 c
0
m(ea) = Z
Q
[Ifacy(acm(a; S); S) = eag+ (1  )Ifacy(acm(a; S); S) + acm(a; S) = eag]d cm(a)
+L(af0m (a; S); S)
Z
Q
[I0faf0gy (af0m (a; S); S) = eag (18)
+(1  )I01 faf0gy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S) = eag]d f0m (a)
+L(af1m (a; S); S)
Z
Q
[I1faf1gy (af1m (a; S); S) = eag
+(1  )I11 faf1gy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S) = eag]d f1m (a):
The rst line represents the total assets held by next periods middle-aged agents, who
are young this period and were also born in the city. Their savings decisions are given by
acy(a
c
m(a; S); S): If they do not receive any bequest, which happens with probability , these
are all the assets they have. There is however a 1    chance that they receive a bequest.
In this case, their total assets consist of their own savings and their parents assets, and are
given by acy(a
c
m(a; S); S) + a
c
m(a; S): The next two lines consider the same cases for young
agents who go to the city and have landless parents, while the last two rows do the same for
those who go to the city and have landed parents.
Finally, next periods asset distribution for middle-aged agents on the farm is given by
the savings decisions of the young who choose to stay there. For the landless-middle-aged
farmers we have,
 f0
0
m (ea) = [(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))Z
Q
I0faf0sy (af0m (a; S); S) = eagd f0m (a) (19)
+(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))
Z
Q
I1faf1sy (af1m (a; S); S) = eagd f1m (a)]:
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And, for the landed-middle-aged farmers we have,
 f1
0
m (ea) = (1  )[(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))Z
Q
I01 faf0sy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S) = eagd f0m (a)
(20)
+(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))
Z
Q
I11 faf1sy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S) = eagd f1m (a)]:
Next, in order to determine H; we consider how the location decisions are updated.
Suppose the current location decisions of agents are given by  = (y; m; o): Since all
young agents survive to middle age, it must be the case that 0m = y: Similarly, since
the survival probability, ; is identical in both locations, 0o = m: The fraction of young
agents who will be on the farm, however, depends on the location decisions of those agents
who are born on the farm. A fraction y will be born on the farm next period. Yet,
according to equation (11), some of them will move to the city. Hence, for any S 0; the
total fraction who stay, among those whose parent does not have any land, is given byR
(1   L(af0m (a; S 0); S 0))d f0
0
m (a): The same expression for those whose parent has land is
given by
R
(1 L(af1m (a; S 0); S 0))d f1
0
m (a). Putting these pieces together implies the following
consistency condition for 0
0 =

y
Z
(1  L(af0m (a; S 0); S 0))d f0
0
m (a)
+
Z
(1  L(af1m (a; S 0); S 0))d f10m (a)

; y; m

: (21)
3.4 Economic Equilibrium
Given a policy function P (S); a recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists
of a set of value functions, V cy (b(a; S); S); V
c
m(a; S); and V
c
o (a; S); for agents who live in the
city and V fsy (a; S); V
fg
y (a; S); V
f
m (b
(a; S); S)  = 0; 1; and V fo (a; S) for agents who live
on the farm; a set of decision rules acy(b
c(a; S); S) and acm(a; S) for agents who live in the
city, and afsy (b
(a; S); S); afgy (b
(a; S); S) and afm (a; S);  = 0; 1; for agents who live on
the farm; a location rule for young farmers, L(b(a; S); S);  = 0; 1; a set of pricing functions
r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S); and a set of aggregate laws of motion H(S) and G(S) such
that:
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 Given the transition functions P (S); H(S); and G(S); and pricing functions r(S);
wc(S); wf (S); and q(S); the value functions and corresponding decision rules solve the
appropriate household problems in equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11),
with b(a; S) = acm(a; S) and b
(a; S) = afm (a; S);  = 0; 1:
 The pricing functions, r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S); are determined by prot maxi-
mization of production units in each sector together with a no arbitrage condition for
capital, i.e. r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S) satisfy
wc(S) = F c2 (K
c; N c);
wf (S) = F f2 (K
f ; N f ; L);
q(S) = F f3 (K
f ; N f ; L);
and
r(S) +  = F c1 (K
c; N c) = F f1 (K
f ; N f ; L);
with aggregate labor and capital in each sector given by
N f = y"
f
y + m"
f
m + o"
f
o ;
N c = (1  y)"cy + (1  m)"cm + (1  o)"co;
and
K = Kc +Kf = Ac + Af ;
where Ac and Af are given by equations (12) and (13), and Kc and Kf are determined
by the no arbitrage condition.
 Aggregate transition functions are consistent with individual decisions: (i) The tran-
sition function G is consistent with individual savings decisions and is determined by
equations (16), (17 ), (18), (19), and (20). (ii) The transition function H is consistent
with individual location decisions and is determined by (21).
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4 Political Equilibrium
So far we have taken the function P as given. The role of the function P is to determine a
state-contingent social security system. We now focus on how the social security system is
determined by equilibrium voting of successive generations. We assume sincere voting, i.e.
that each agent votes for his most preferred alternative in each period. It is not obvious
whether an equilibrium with social security can be supported as a political outcome in a
democratic voting process with nonaltruistic agents. The current young and middle-aged
do not benet from the system, yet their support is critical. Indeed, the current young and
middle-aged will always choose to pay nothing in the current period, as long as they believe
that the system will be there for them in the future.
In this paper we consider a variant of constant social security taxes: (i) if a social security
system has never been in place, it may start at any point, (ii) once a system is operating
the tax remains constant, and successive generations take a simple yes/no vote whether or
not to keep the existing system.
In order to induce the agents in this economy to vote for social security according to
this simple rule, we introduce the following reputational mechanism: if a majority of voters
deviate from the social security system, then the system collapses. Young and middle-aged
workers balance the benet of not paying into the system against the cost of not receiving
anything from it in the future. As a result, if they eliminate an existing system (or if they fail
to start a system when it is optimal for the median voter to do so), they take into account the
fact that the system will not be there tomorrow. Although the reputational mechanism we
use is quite stringent, we follow this route as it is the standard political economy approach
in the literature (see Cooley and Soares 1999, Galasso 1999, and Boldrin and Rustichini
2000).16 Finally note there can be many constant tax rates that are sustainable under the
reputational mechanism we have just described. In the current analysis we focus on taxes
that maximize the lifetime utility of the median voter.
16 Two early papers that emphasized the political sustainability of social security were Browning (1975)
and Sjoblom (1985).
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Recall that P (	;;  1; 1) = ( ; h0), where  1 is last periods social security tax, and h
is an indicator of whether or not the introduction of social security was ever optimal for a
median voter in the past. If h = 1 it was, if h = 0, it wasnt. In the following discussion
when we say that the system has collapsed or has been dismantled we are referring to a
situation where h = 1 and  1 = 0:
Denition 1 For any  1 > 0 and h = 1; we will say that a policy function P (S) is
sustainable in state S = (	;;  1; 1); if
V M(	;;  1; 1;P )  VM(	;);
where V M is the remaining lifetime utility of the median voter in an economy with current
aggregate state S = (	;;  1; 1) and policy function P; and VM is the remaining lifetime
utility of the median voter if social security is eliminated forever.
The value VM(	;) only depends on 	 and ; i.e. the aggregate state (the distribution
of physical capital and the distribution of agents between the city and the farm) in which
the social security tax is eliminated. In other words, P is sustainable in S if a majority of
voters vote yes for keeping it today with tomorrows taxes determined by P , instead of
moving to an economy with no social security. Let the indicator function M(S;P ) denote
the yes/no decision of the median voter, i.e.
M(	;;  1; 1;P ) =
8<: 1; if V M(	;;  1; 1;P )  VM(	;)0; otherwise :
Note that a median voter considering a future without social security takes into account
the resulting rise in aggregate capital stock and the decline in the rate of return. The decline
in the rate of return gives the median voter an additional reason (besides reputation) to
keep an existing system.
To dene the policy function P , we begin by noting that the history, h, of the social
security system is important for its future evolution. Specically, if the current tax level is
zero, it is either because no median voter has voted for social security and a system is still
a possibility, or the system was dismantled in the past and no possibility exists of a positive
tax in the future.
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If  1 = 0, and h = 1, then the social security system collapsed sometime in the past
and cannot be restarted. Therefore, P (	;;  1; h) = ( ; h0) is given by
P (	;; 0; 1) = (0; 1); (22)
i.e. once the system collapses, it can never be restored.
If todays political state is  1 > 0 and h = 1, then sometime in the past a median voter
instituted his most preferred tax and this tax has been in e¤ect since then: In this case, the
current generation simply takes a yes/no vote and the system either continues at the same
tax level or ends because of a no vote. The result of this yes/no vote depends on whether
state S = (	;;  1; 1) is sustainable. Hence,
P (	;;  1; 1) =
8<: ( 1; 1); if M(	;;  1; 1;P ) = 1(0; 1); if M(	;;  1; 1;P ) = 0 : (23)
Note that if M(	;;  1; 1;P ) = 0; then the system moves to  = 0 and h = 1; and stays
there forever.
The case that requires more careful attention is when  1 = 0 and h = 0, since then a
social security system has never been operative. It may, or may not start today, depending
on the preferences of the median voter. If there has never been a social security system in the
past, the current median voter can make a proposal of a tax rate for a yes/no vote. Let b(S)
be the proposal by the median voter at state S: Furthermore, let   = argmax V M(S;P )
be the optimal tax rate chosen by the median voter under the constant policy rule P ; i.e.
the optimal tax rate chosen under the assumption that it will be in e¤ect forever. We specify
P such that
P (	;; 0; 0) =
8>>><>>>:
(0; 0); if b =   = argmax V M(S;P ) = 0
( ; 1); if b =   = argmax V M(S;P ) > 0
(0; 1); if b 6=  
: (24)
Hence, if the median voter prefers a zero tax rate, then the social security system does
not start. If the preferred tax rate of the median voter is positive, then this tax rate is
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proposed by the median voter for a yes/no vote, and, if the preferences are single-peaked, is
accepted by the majority as the current tax rate. Any other proposal by the median voter
results in the collapse of the system. It is important to note that the proposal by the median
voter maximizes V M(S;P )  his lifetime utility under the constant rule. If   > 0; the tax
rate will indeed remain constant as long as it is sustainable. Hence any sustainable  ; if
proposed by the median voter, will initiate a system that will last forever. It might, however,
be the case that   = 0; and the median voter does not initiate social security. He is allowed
to do that if and only if his lifetime utility is maximized by   = 0 assuming that taxes
will be zero next period. In particular, the median voter is not allowed to propose b = 0
hoping that a social security will start tomorrow. Such a proposal results in the collapse of
the system. If such a proposal was allowed, social security would never get initiated since
successive median voters would simply wait for the next generation to initiate the system.
A political equilibrium is then a recursive competitive equilibrium with the policy func-
tion P dened by equations (22), (23), and (24). Once a median voter sets   > 0; then
future generations of median voters simply decide whether to sustain the system or not,
knowing that once the system is dismantled, it is gone forever. Obviously, the median voter
who chooses   > 0; takes into account the reputational mechanism that is in e¤ect.
At a general level, not much can be said analytically about this model. In the following
sections we choose functional forms, assign parameter values, and perform numerical eval-
uations. Some valuable analytical insight can be gained, however, by focusing on a steady
state economy without capital. This is what we turn to next.
5 Steady State Economy without Capital
Consider a steady state version of the economy outlined above, i.e. let 0 = ;	0 = 	;
h0 = h; and  0 =  . In the steady state there is a constant fraction  of population that lives
on the farm, i.e. y = m = o = : Suppose the farm sector uses only labor and land, while
labor is the only factor of production in the city sector. In particular, let the production
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function in the farm sector be
Y f = f (N f )(L)1 :
Hence, with L = 1; the rental rates are given by
wf = f (N f ) 1; (25)
and
q = (1  )f (N f ): (26)
Since we are in a steady state, the aggregate labor on the farm is N f = ("fy+"
f
m+"
f
o): Note
that since land is a xed factor of production, there are decreasing returns to labor. As a
result, when people live longer and the farm sector gets more crowded, i.e. when  increases,
wf declines and q increases. It is also the case that as people move out of agriculture the
pressure on farm wages is reduced, since as  declines, wf rises and q declines.
Let the production function in the city be
Y c = cN c; (27)
which implies wc = c. Finally, let
u(c) = log(c): (28)
Furthermore, suppose agents have access to a storage technology that transfers resources
from current to future periods. In particular, suppose a unit of goods not consumed today
becomes 1 + r units of goods tomorrow.
5.1 Saving Behavior of Middle-Aged Agents
We start by characterizing the behavior of middle-aged agents who are most likely to be
median voters in equilibrium. It turns out that the amount a middle-aged person chooses to
store depends critically on the social security tax. For each middle-aged agent there exists a
threshold tax level that depends on his wealth. If the existing social security tax is greater
than this threshold, then a middle-aged agent stores nothing, while if it is strictly less than
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this threshold, he stores a positive amount. Intuitively, a persons threshold tax level reects
how much of his resources he would like to transfer from today to tomorrow. If the actual
tax level is lower than what he wants to save, then the agent saves. Furthermore, if a person
saves, his savings decision is decreasing in the social security tax, increasing in his wealth,
and increasing in the survival probability.
These results are formalized in the next proposition. All proofs are in Appendix B. To
streamline the presentation it is helpful to dene middle-age and old-age income variables.
Let Ijm; j 2 fc; f0; f1g; be pre-tax total labor and land incomes of the middle-aged. So,
Icm = "
c
mw
c; If0m = "
f
mw
f ; and If1m = "
f
mw
f + q=: Let Ijo ; j 2 fc; f0; f1g be total labor and
land incomes of the old-age. So, Ico = "
c
ow
c; Ifo = "
f
ow
f + q=;  2 f0; 1g: Note that all old
farmers have the same labor and land incomes, regardless of their middle-age land status.
However, it is easier in terms of exposition to separate them.
Proposition 1 Let p = (r; wc; wf ; q): Given p and  ; for any middle-aged person of type j 2
fc; f0; f1g; there exits a threshold tax level ^ jm(a; p; )  0 such that: (i) If ^ jm(a; p; )   ,
then ajm(a; p; ) = 0. (ii) If ^
j
m(a; p; ) >  , then a
j
m(a; p; ) =
(1+r)(Ijm+(1+r)a ) (Ijo+2=)
(1+r)(1+)
>
0; and @a
j
m(a;p;)
@
< 0, @a
j
m(a;p;)
@a
> 0; and @a
j
m(a;p,)
@
> 0:
The next proposition provides a characterization of the threshold tax level ^ : This thresh-
old is increasing in the middle-aged agents wealth, since an agent with higher wealth has
more incentive to transfer his resources to old age. More importantly, if the non-social secu-
rity income of the old is su¢ ciently high relative to the pre-tax income of the middle-aged,
then the reservation tax is zero.
Proposition 2 Given p and  ; for any middle-aged person of type j 2 fc; f0; f1g: (i)
^ jm(a; p; ) = maxf0; (1+r)(I
j
m+(1+r)a) Ijo
2=+(1+r)
g; (ii) If ^ jm(a; p; ) > 0; then @^
j
m(a;p;)
@a
> 0:
Amiddle-aged agent prefers to save a positive amount as long as (1+r)(Ijm+(1+r)a) >
Ijo ; i.e. he has relatively more resources when he is middle-aged then he has when he is old. If
a middle-aged agent has relatively high income when he is old, he does not want to transfer
more resources to old age via social security. In this environment it is the middle-aged-
landless farmers who face the steepest age-earnings proles since they have wage earnings
25
today, but will have wage plus land earnings tomorrow. The city worker (who only has wage
earnings), and the middle-aged farmers (who have land income both today and tomorrow)
face atter age-earnings proles than the middle-age-landless farmer. As a results, as long
as a middle-aged-landless farmer is the median voter and faces a steep age-income prole,
he would prefer not to have social security. In our simulation exercise in the next Section,
a middle-aged-landless farmer indeed turns out to be the median voter in the initial (1800)
steady state and he does not want to implement a social security system. Once the median
voter is in the city, a social security system emerges. We rst, however, focus on this
transition within this simple framework.
5.2 How Can a Social Security System Emerge?
We now consider the decision of the middle-aged median voter. If the return to social
security, 2=, is less than the return to storage, 1 + r, the median voter chooses a zero tax,
and any agent who wants to save, saves entirely through storage. Suppose 2= > 1+r. Then,
if the median voter wants to save, he chooses a positive tax, saves entirely via social security,
and stores nothing. All middle-aged agents who have higher wealth than the median voter,
store positive amounts, since they want to save more than the median voter. In both cases,
the key is whether or not middle-aged agents want to save. If they do not, then neither
social security nor storage will be operative in equilibrium. This implies that in order for
the social security tax to be zero in equilibrium, either the return to social security must be
less than the return to other vehicles of saving, or the median voter must prefer not to save.
These results are outlined in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given p; let a be the stored assets of the median voter, let ajm be the storage
decision of the middle-aged median voter of type j 2 fc; f0; f1g; and let   denote his pre-
ferred tax rate. (i) If 2

< (1+r); then   = 0; and ajm(a; p; 
) = maxf0; (1+r)(Ijm+(1+r)a) Ijo
(1+r)(1+)
g:
(ii) If 2

> (1 + r); then   = maxf0; 2(Ijm+(1+r)a) Ijo
2(+1=)
g; and ajm(a; p;  ) = 0. (iii) If
2

= (1 + r); then   2 [0; ^ j]; and ajm(a; p;  ) = maxf0; (1+r)[I
j
m+(1+r)a ] (Ijo+ 2


)
(1+r)(1+)
g.
To highlight the implications of Proposition 3 for the emergence of social security, consider
the following example. Suppose everyone is living on the farm. Furthermore to avoid the
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trivial outcome, suppose that the return to social security is greater than storage (2= >
1 + r). Finally, let the e¢ ciency units of labor be identical over time and across sectors and
set to 1.
In this simple world, old farmers want as much as they can get in terms of a social security
tax, while the young always prefer to have zero social security tax.17 That leaves the middle-
aged farmers decision to consider, which depends on their asset level. Middle-aged farmers
fall into one of two groups: those who have land and those who do not. It is easy to show
that middle-aged-landless farmers are more likely to have a steeper age-earnings prole than
middle-aged-landed farmers, and so are more likely to prefer a lower tax level. Consider a
landless farmer with assets a0 and a landed farmer with assets a1: Part (ii) of Proposition 3
suggests that the tax level chosen by the landless farmer will be smaller than the one chosen
by the landed farmer as long as
wf (2   1) + 2(1 + r)ao   q < wf (2   1) + 2(1 + r)a1 + 2q   q; (29)
which reduces to
(1 + r)ao < (1 + r)a1 + q:
As a result, all landless farmers prefer a lower tax level than all landed farmers as long
as the landless farmer with the highest asset level has an asset income that is lower than
the asset plus land income of the landed farmer with the lowest asset level. This is likely
to hold since the landless farmers receive no bequests while the landed farmers do. For the
purposes of this example, suppose this condition holds. Therefore, one can rank preferred
tax levels in the following way:  fy < 
f0
m < 
f1
m < 
f
o :
Then, the question is who is the median voter. The measure of the young population is 1;
and the measure of the old and middle-aged-landed populations is also 1, since +(1 ) = 1.
This leaves the measure of the population that is middle-aged and landless, , in the middle.
So, in this simple example, when everyone lives on the farm, the median voter must be the
17 One can show, in an environment with no storage, that the young always prefer a zero social security
tax. Including storage only allows another alternative to social security and therefore should only bolster
this result.
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middle-aged-landless farmer. If the middle-aged-landless farmer who is the median voter
prefers no social security, social security will be inoperative. This will happen as long as
wf (2   1) + 2a(1 + r) < q: (30)
Clearly, this condition is dependent on parameters, but it is more likely to happen when
 is small, q is big, wf is small, and r is small. If a person discounts the future highly, he
wont want to save, and will be opposed to social security as well. If the land return is high
relative to the farm wage, this implies that the age-earnings prole for the landless farmer
is steep, and he is less likely to want to save. And lastly, if a farmer has low asset income
when middle-aged, he is less likely to want to save for old age. Overall it is more likely to
happen if the middle-aged landless farmer faces a relatively steep age-income prole.
Now consider a new steady state with a signicant fraction of the population living in
the city, so that the median voter is a city worker. The middle-aged city workers preferred
tax level is strictly positive as long as
wc(2   1) + 2a(1 + r) > 0; (31)
Condition (31) will hold as long as  > 1=2. If city workers do not discount the future too
heavily, or they have enough asset income when middle-aged, then they vote for a positive
amount of social security, and the economy will move from a steady state without social
security to one with social security.
Discussion Land plays an important role in this framework for two reasons. First, it is
a xed factor on the farm, so increasing survival probabilities reduces farm wages. This
crowding of land encourages young farmers to migrate to the city. Second, land provides
insurance for farmers. The promise of land upon survival to old age for middle-aged-landless
farmers creates a steep age-income prole that discourages saving. 18 A key to this result
18 The steepness of the age-income prole depends on the return to land relative to the return to farm
labor. With a higher share to farm labor, land plays a smaller role, causing the age-income prole of the
landless farmer to atten. See the example following Proposition 3.
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is that there is no market for land. The inherited nature of land creates the wedge in age-
income proles. However, if there were a market for land, as long as the return to land is
greater than the return to social security this result would still hold.
The political economy aspect of the environment is simple, yet critical. Middle-aged
agents only pay into the system one period, while their benets are based on two periods
of payments. This encourages support for social security, even when age-income proles are
at. Land is not available for city workers as old age security. They earn only labor income
when middle-aged and old. Therefore, they have age-income proles that are relatively
atter than that of landless farmers, and thus are more likely to support social security.
An important feature of this framework is that as the fraction of people living on the farm
falls, the identity of the median voter shifts from the farm to the city and support for social
security can emerge. As was highlighted in the last section, in order for social security to
arise at all, the returns to the middle-aged voter, 2=; must be greater than the returns to
saving, 1 + r. But, even if 2= > 1 + r; a middle-aged agent might choose not to implement
social security if he does not want to save.
6 Economy with Capital
We are now ready to carry out our quantitative exercise and evaluate if a calibrated version
of our model is consistent with the historical experience of the U.S. economy. Consider the
general setup from Section 2 and assume that young and middle-aged agents save in the form
of risk-free, productive capital. Although the basic intuition from the analytical results of
the previous section remains valid, there are now general equilibrium e¤ects at play as well.
This is critical for two reasons. First, the changes in relative productivity levels and survival
probabilities will not only determine farm wages and land returns via migration, but will
also a¤ect all prices via changes in individual capital accumulation decisions. Therefore, it
is fundamentally a quantitative question if the exogenous forces we consider and the general
equilibrium e¤ects that follow can generate a farm-to-city migration that is in line with
the data. Second, in their decisions about the social security system, agents still compare
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the return to capital with the return to social security, but the return to capital is now
an endogenous variable. This is important because while higher TFP levels after 1800
push the interest rate up, higher capital accumulation associated with longer lives pushes it
down. Since, as we have emphasized above, the lower capital stock and higher interest rate
associated with social security can play an important role in the median voters decision to
keep an existing system, general equilibrium e¤ects on the interest rate are of fundamental
importance to the question at hand.
In this section we show that a calibrated version of this economy can generate an initial
steady state in which a majority of the population lives on the farm and the median voter
chooses not to introduce a social security system, and a transition to a new steady state
along which the median voter chooses a positive and sustainable social security tax. We
interpret the initial steady state as the U.S. economy in 1800 and the nal steady state
as the U.S. economy in 1940. Computing the transition is non-trivial. Not only do the
capital stock and location choices (and hence prices) have to be consistent with individual
asset accumulation and migration decisions, but the sequence of tax levels that individuals
expect must be those that the median voter in each generation chooses. In order to develop
quantitative implications of this model economy, we rst choose functional forms for utility
and production functions and assign parameter values.
As in the previous section, let the utility function be u(c) = log(c): Since the production
side of our model economy closely follows Hansen and Prescott (2002), we borrow both func-
tional forms and parameter values from them. In particular, we assume that the production
function on the farm sector is given by
Y f = f

N f
 
Kf

[L]1   ;
and in the city sector it is
Y c = c [N c]1  [Kc] :
These choices imply that
wc = (1  )c(N c) (Kc); (32)
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wf = f (N f ) 1(Kf ); (33)
q = (1    )f (N f )(Kf ); (34)
and
r = rc = c(N c)1 (Kc) 1    = f (N f )(Kf ) 1    = rf : (35)
The parameter values we use are  = 0:6;  = 0:1; and  = 0:4:19 We set the length of a
model period to 20 years. We also assume that capital depreciates completely, i.e.  = 1,
which is not critical for any of the results.
Next we select the values for relative TFP levels and survival probabilities. We borrow
TFP numbers from Greenwood and Uysal (2005). For the 1800 economy we set f1800 =
c1800 = 1: Since the relative TFP values are the key determinants of migration decisions in
the model, we keep f1940 = 1 and set 
c
1940 = 2:19: These choices imply that the relative
TFP growth is as reported by Greenwood and Uysal (2005) and reproduced in Figure 4.
Historical estimates for age-specic-mortality rates and life tables do not go back further
than 1850 (see Haines 1988). In 1850, a 60 year-old man had about a 47% chance of living
to his 80th birthday. Since available evidence does not indicate any signicant improvement
in mortality between 1800 and 1850, we set 1800 = 0:47:20 In 1940 the chances that a 60 year
old man saw his 80th birthday increased to about 56%. Therefore, we select 1940 = 0:56:
Finally, we assume that agents have at age-earning proles both on the farm and in the
city, i.e. "ji = 1 for j 2 ff; cg and i 2 fy;m; og: Age-earning proles in the 19th century
did indeed di¤er from the usual hump-shaped pattern. According to Kaelble and Thomas
(1991), incomes of working class household heads increased slightly between ages 20 and
40, but were pretty much at after age 40. These at proles were a common feature of
19 The value for capital share in the city (industrial) technology,  = 0:4; is the standard value for the
postwar U.S. economy. The labor share is assumed to be the same for both sectors,  = 1   = 0:6: Finally,
 = 0:1 is picked to be consistent with historical evidence on agricultural incomes. See Hansen and Prescott
(2002) for details.
20 According to Haines (1988), the crude death rate in New York City was as high in 1850 as it was in 1804
(see Figure 1, page 150). In many New England towns there was not much improvement in life expectancy
at age 20 either (see Table 1, page 151).
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agricultural workers as well as low skilled non-agricultural workers.21 We make the strong
assumption that age-earning proles were also at in the city. We consider this to be a
conservative assumption for our results, since a hump-shaped prole for city workers would
simply increase the incentives of middle aged workers to shift resources to their old age and
increase the political support for social security even further.
Note that we x all these parameter values prior to running our simulations. We are
left with only one more parameter to pick, : We set  = 0:818 (a yearly value of 0.99).
This value implies that the yearly return to capital in the 1940 steady state is about 5.8%.22
Table I summarizes our parameter choices.
Table I  Parameter Values
     f1800 
c
1800 
f
1940 
c
1940 1800 1940
0.818 0.6 0.1 0.4 1 1 1 1 2.19 0.47 0.56
6.1 Results
Table II shows the results for the initial steady state in 1800. In our 1800 economy everyone
lives on the farm,  = 1. This is consistent with the U.S. experience. At that time, about
94% of population lived in rural areas, and the fraction of population working on the farm
was possibly even higher (see Figure 1). In the 1800 steady state, the median voter is a
landless-middle-aged farmer, who does not want social security, so the equilibrium value of
 is zero. Notice that this happens even though 2= (about 4.25) is larger than 1 + r, so
21 Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) contrast relatively at wage proles of agricultural workers and land owners
with steep wage proles of entrepreneurs in the 19th century. They model the emergence of capitalism
within a model of structural transformation in which entrepreneurs inuence their childrens preferences in
an attempt to make them more patient.
22 Hansen and Prescott (2002) target a 4-4.5 percent rate of return on capital for post-war period. Cooley
and Prescott (1995) report a higher value, 6.9 percent. The value for the return on capital in our new steady
state is right between these two values. See Gomme and Rupert (2005) for a recent discussion.
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the return to social security is greater than the return to capital. However, the middle-aged-
landless farmer prefers to save nothing due to his steep age-income prole.
It is important to note that farmers participate both in the social security system and
in the political process in the model economy, and the behavior of middle-aged-landless
farmers determines the fact that social security is not implemented in 1800 steady state.
While farmers were indeed part of the political process (as laws regarding social security
had to be passed in both the Senate and the Congress), they were not included in the 1935
Social Security Act. A simple modication of the model in which social security taxes and
benets only a¤ect the city workers, while they are voted at the national level can deliver
the same results as long as social security implies some (however small) administrative cost
that the farmers have to bear.
TABLE II - Initial Steady State
1800
 0
y 1
1 + r 2.449
wf 0.311
q 0.384
q= 0.384
K 0.052
Kf 0.052
N f 2.470
Median Voter middle-age-landless farmer
Table III and Figure 6 illustrate the transitional dynamics from the following exercise.
We assume that the economy is at its 1800 steady state initially (period 0) and suddenly and
unexpectedly productivity and life expectancy increase to their 1940 values. In the period
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of the change (period 1), the capital stock is xed at its initial steady state level. However,
due to the higher productivity in the city and the higher survival probability, the city is a
much more attractive location for young farmers and many choose to migrate, y = 0:66:
This population shift alters the labor supply on the farm and in the city. Indeed, since a
large fraction of population migrates in the rst period of the transition, both farm and city
wages rise. Given the rise in productivity levels, the return to capital, which is xed at its
old steady state value, increases signicantly from 2.449 to 5.718. As people start moving
away from the farm, the return to land starts to fall as well.
TABLE III - Transition
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 0 0 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
y 1 0.660 0.349 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160
1 + r 2.449 5.718 3.718 3.443 3.203 3.126 3.088 3.072
wf 0.311 0.325 0.416 0.544 0.548 0.549 0.550 0.551
wc - 0.376 0.501 0.528 0.554 0.563 0.567 0.569
q 0.384 0.265 0.187 0.112 0.113 0.114 0.114 0.114
K 0.052 0.052 0.168 0.232 0.262 0.272 0.278 0.280
Because the migration only a¤ects the location of the young, in period 1 the median
voter is still a middle-aged landless farmer, who prefers no social security.23 So, in the initial
period of the change, the tax remains unchanged at 0. However, agents are aware that the
mass migration of young farmers to the city will shift the identity of the median voter in the
next period, and alter support for social security.
In the second period of the transition, the initial young migrants now become middle-
aged-city workers, who support a positive (sustainable) level of social security,  = :08.24
23 We computationally verify that preferences are single peaked.
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After the third period, migration stops and the fraction of young farmers remains at 0.16.
However, the new steady state farm population takes ve periods to attain, as the initial
young migrants age. As the population reallocates between the two locations and people
start accumulating capital, the return to capital falls to 3.718, and then converges to 3.072
in the new steady state.
Next, consider the 1940 economy, which is found in Table IV. Now about 16% of the
population lives on the farm, a value close to the 23% observed in the U.S. at that time (see
Figure 1). This is quite remarkable since nothing in our parameter choices targets directly
the fraction of agents living on the farm.
TABLE IV - Final Steady State
1940
 0.080
y 0.160
1 + r 3.072
wf 0.551
wc 0.569
q 0.114
q= 0.710
K 0.280
Kf 0.012
Kc 0.267
N f 0.413
N c 2.167
Median Voter middle-aged city worker
24 Again, we computationally verify that preferences are single peaked in the period of the vote for a
positive tax.
35
Consistent with historical experience, the return on capital is much higher in the new
steady state, despite a more than fourfold increase in aggregate capital stock. In 1940,
about 16% of the population lives on the farm, but a much smaller (about 4.3%) fraction
of aggregate capital stock is allocated to farm production. Also consistent with historical
evidence, the rental value of land declines signicantly. In 1940 it is about one third of its
1800 value.25 Lastly, note that while the returns per unit of land, q, fall, the returns to land
for landholders, q=, actually rise, .38 to .71, which keeps them on the farm despite rising
city wages.
In the new steady state, even though total labor supply in the city rises due to the
increases in life expectancy and in city population, because of the increases in technological
progress and in the aggregate capital stock, the city wage rises. There is no technological
advance on the farm. But the out migration of farmers causes labor supply on the farm to
fall, and so farm wages rise. And, while there is a large increase in the aggregate capital
stock, the technological advance in the city, coupled with the increase in labor supply in the
city, leads to an increase in the return to capital.
It is worth noting that the demographic changes alone would not lead to the rural-urban
transition that the U.S. experienced. When we only change survival probabilities, social
security does not emerge, because the change does not induce enough migration. Indeed,
everybody remains on the farm. The key e¤ect of this change is an increase in the capital
stock because people save more anticipating a longer life.
When only TFP changes social security does emerge but the rural/urban migration is
not nearly as pronounced. Roughly 33% continue to live on the farm (in the data it is 23%
and in our economy with changes in both survival probabilities and the TFP we get 16%).
Furthermore, the social security tax is considerably higher than in the economy with both
factors at work. This underscores the conclusion that the interaction between technology
and demographics is a powerful impetus for social change.
25 According to Hansen and Prescott (2002), the value of U.S. farmland relative to GDP declined from
88% in 1870 to 20% in 1950 (see Table 2, page 1209).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we o¤er one possible explanation for the emergence of pay-as-you-go social
security systems. Our story ties this development to the population shift from rural to urban
areas, a migration that has its roots in increased life expectancy conditional on reaching age
60, and in technological progress in the city that outpaced that on the farm. This story ts
the experience of the United States very well. We show that there is an initial steady state
consistent with the United States in the 1800s, with most people living on the farm and
no social security system. Changes in life expectancy and technological progress in the city
that are in line with those observed in the data initiate a transition to a new steady state.
Along this transition path, a generation votes a social security system into place, which is
supported throughout the transition and in the new steady state.
The current framework can be used to shed light on two issues of fundamental impor-
tance. First is the question of why did di¤erent countries follow such di¤erent strategies in
constructing their social safety nets, choosing di¤erent degrees of reliance on state versus
the market.26 The current model provides a natural framework to link demographics, ge-
ography, and di¤erences in the structural transformation of countries to di¤erences in social
insurance institutions. Second is the dramatic transformation that is taking place in China.
Currently, there is no national pension system(nor much in the way of social insurance) in
China, but as the worlds largest ever peacetime ow of migration continues, and the tradi-
tional support systems via the family are dismantled, we would expect the demand for such
institutions to grow. We leave these questions for future research.
26 Perotti and Schwienbacher (2008) study how large inationary shocks in the rst half of the XX
century, which devastated middle class savings in some countries, a¤ected their reliance on state versus
market institutions.
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8 Appendix A
Figure 1: Hernandez (1996), Table 4.
Figure 2: The urbanization rates are from the 1930 Census, Table 6, page 10, available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/16440598v2_TOC.pdf. The elderly
population is calculated from Hobbs and Stoops (2002), Table 7, page A-19. The dates for
state old age assitance laws are taken from ElderWed, http://www.elderweb.com/home/node/2896.
Figure 3: The fraction of the labor force in agriculture is based on Mitchell (2003), Table
B1 Economicaly Active Population, by Major Industrial Groups, page 147. The adoption of
social security dates are from the Social Security Administration (2006).
Figure 4: Greenwood and Uysal (2005), Figure 9.
Figure 5: The data for 1850 and 1900 are from Haines (1988) and for 1950 are taken
from the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1964). They are the average
of the conditional survival probabilities from age 60 to 65, from 65 to 70, from 70 to 75 and
75 to 80. The 1850 numbers are for white males only.
9 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: The problem of a middle-aged agent is
max
a0

log(Im + (1 + r)a     a0) +  log(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

)

:
The rst order condition for a0 is given by
 1
Im + (1 + r)a     a0 +
(1 + r)
Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2
 0:
Solving for an interior a0 yields
a0 =
(1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a   ]  (Io + 2=)
(1 + r)(1 + )
;
which is positive i¤
(1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a   ]  (Io + 2=)  0: (36)
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Since the right hand side of this inequality is decreasing in  , there exists a threshold tax
level below which saving decision is positive and above which saving decision is zero. Finally,
if a0 > 0; then
@a0
@
=
 ((1 + r) + 2

)
(1 + r)(1 + )
< 0;
@a0
@a
=
(1 + r)
1 + 
> 0;
and
@a0
@
=
(1 + r)[Im + a   ] + (1 + ) 22 + (Io + 2 )
(1 + r)(1 + )2
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 2: In order to compute the threshold tax level at which the
savings decision becomes strictly positive, we solve for  in Equation (36). This yields
^ = max

0;
(1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a]  Io
2= + (1 + r)

:
If the threshold tax level is strictly positive, i.e. if ^ > 0, then
@
@a
=
(1 + r)2
2= + (1 + r)
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider now the problem of the middle-aged median voter.
His optimal tax problem is given by
max


log(Im + (1 + r)a     a0()) +  log(Io + (1 + r)a0() + 2

)

:
The rst order condition for  is
 (1 + @a0
@
)
Im + (1 + r)a     a0() +
[(1 + r)@a
0
@
+ 2

]
Io + (1 + r)a0() + 2
 0: (37)
Remember that each agent has a threshold tax level. Above this level, the agent chooses
to save zero assets, and below this level the agent chooses a positive amount of assets, and
the derivative of this asset choice with respect to the tax level is strictly negative. Therefore,
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it is useful to think of the two di¤erent cases, rst, when the tax level is over the reservation
tax and second, when the tax level is below the reservation tax.
Case 1: Suppose the optimal tax level of the median voter is greater than or equal to
his reservation tax,    ^ and as a result his savings decision is zero, i.e., a0 = 0; and
@a0
@
= 0:Then Equation (37) implies that the optimal tax level is given by:
  = maxf0; 
2

[Im + (1 + r)a]  Io
2

+  2
| {z }
A
g:
Recall that the reservation tax level is given by:
^ = maxf0; (1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a]  Io2

+ (1 + r)| {z }
B
g:
Note that if 2

> 1 + r; A > B, and   > ^: If 2

= 1 + r; A = B, and   = ^ : And, if
2

< 1 + r; then A < B and then the only way for    ^ is if B < 0. This is true when
(1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a] < Io; and implies that   = ^ = 0:
Case 2: Consider now the other case. Suppose the optimal tax level of the median
voter is strictly less than his reservation tax,   < ^ and as a result his asset choice, and its
derivative are given by a0 = (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a  ] (Io+
2

)
(1+r)(1+)
and @a
0
@
=
 ((1+r)+ 2

)
(1+r)(1+)
; respectively.
Then the rst order condition in Equation (37) can be written as:
 [(1 + r)  2

]
(1 + r)[Im + (1 + r)a   ] + [Io + 2 ]
+
 (1 + r)[(1 + r)  2

]
(1 + r)2[Im + (1 + r)a   ] + [Io + 2 ]
 0:
Note that if 2

> 1 + r; the left hand side of the rst order condition is always posi-
tive which is a contradiction. If 2

= 1 + r; then the rst order condition is zero for
all tax levels below the reservation tax level. In other words, we have   2 [0; ^) and
a0 = (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a 
] (Io+ 2 )
(1+r)(1+)
: And, if 2

< 1 + r; then the left hand side of the rst
order condition is negative for all tax levels below the reservation level, so   = 0, and
a0 = (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a] Io
(1+r)(1+)
:
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We summarize these results in Table A1.
TABLE A1
Returns Decisions
2

< 1 + r   = 0
a0 = maxf0; (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a] Io
(1+r)(1+)
g
2

> 1 + r   = maxf0; 2[Im+(1+r)a] Io2

+2
g
a0 = 0
2

= 1 + r   2 [0;maxf0; (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a] Io2

+(1+r)
g]
a0 = maxf0; (1+r)[Im+(1+r)a ] (Io+ 2


)
(1+r)(1+)
g
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Figure 1 --- Population in Rural and Urban Areas
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Figure 2: Urbanization and Elderly (65+) Population Across U.S. States -- 1930
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Figure 3: Fraction of Labor Force in Agriculture in 1890 and The Adoption of Social Security
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Figure 4 --- TFP in Agriculture and Non Agriculture
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Figure 5 --- Conditional Survival Probabilities
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Figure 6b --- Transitional Dynamics
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Figure 6c -- Transitional Dynamics
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Figure 6a --- Transitional Dynamics
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